Lessons from the Challenger
Written in 1987. Frighteningly true today, after the Columbia accident...
Introduction
It is now one year from the Challenger explosion. Before January 28, 1986 many of us (including much of the NASA staff) were living in a dream world. The dream was one where the Space Shuttle would solve all problems and finally open the space frontier to everybody and everything.
This dream world and reality met head-to-head last year. Reality won.
This note is about what has hopefully been learned about space and people and technology because of the accident. It is a truism that failures are often more important than successes. This failure was certainly important. Are the lessons learned are worth the price?
The Vision
The space shuttle program was created by people with a great vision, one that I share. That vision is one where humans live and work in space permanently, making it the next frontier. The program creators had a firm belief in the shuttle as the first step towards that goal.
The project was sold to congress, the defense department, and the american people as the magic ticket to outer space. Payloads and people would be delivered to low orbit so frequently, cheaply, and routinely that space would become boring. They were lying, and they knew it.
These people were blinded by the vision. They felt that the success or failure of the vision was dependent entirely on the success or failure of the shuttle project. So they compromised, dissembled, ignored facts, in fact did anything required so that the project was not canceled.
The result was an impossible budget, impossible schedule, and impossible expectations. The project sponsors should have walked away from it. But they lacked the courage to face the reality that would imperil their vision. Many if not most of the problems with the shuttle project stem from the decision to even have a shuttle program in the first place, given the constraints.
Lesson One:
One must always have the courage to say no.
Lesson Two:
The game is rigged: reality always wins.
-or-
Wishing does not make it so.
Lessons from Evolution
Many parallels exist between evolution and successful project management. This is hardly surprising or profound: systems with similar rules and similar constraints exhibit similar behavior. In both evolution and technological projects, the output (organism or product) must be well adapted to it's environment to be successful. And the similarities of competition and ecological niches in both systems are too obvious to enumerate.
One possible lesson from this analogy has to do with how an organism or a technological object is created. Evolution is never revolutionary, so to speak. The design of a new organism alway uses modules from previous organisms, modules that have been throughly tested and debugged over billions of years of use. The perfect example of this is the genetic code itself, which has remained unchanged throughout the entire history of life on this planet.
Nature has created amazing creatures using this scheme. Many of these creatures are in fact revolutionary in their impact on the planet (birds, for example). But in every case there is a continuous path between new organisms and previous ones. For example, animals with tractor treads do not exist because there is no transitional path. Revolutionary organisms in nature are always profoundly evolutionary.
The analogy for technical objects is clear: successful revolutionary inventions evolve from previous inventions. The integration of modules may be new, but the modules themselves have existed before. Outstanding examples may be the steam engine, the DC3, the Model T, the digital computer, the personal computer. According to a recent article in Science, the only breakthrough invention in modern times that did not evolve continuously from previous inventions is the transistor.
The space shuttle is revolutionary in both senses, and dangerously so. Just about every feature of the shuttle was new and untested. This design was forced onto the project managers by the impossible constraints of the project. The use of "success engineering", and going directly from design into production just made matters worse.
Lesson Three:
Successful revolutionary projects are always evolutionary in nature.
A successful species in nature absolutely must have a good gene pool, with lots of variation. It has been shown countless times that species with narrow gene pools are but marking time until extinction. It is evident why this is so. Species with limited variability have single failure points: a single environmental change, or a single disease, can wipe them out completely. It is like reproduction: it does not affect the survival of an individual, but life would not exist without it.
To sell the shuttle program, the sponsors narrowed the NASA gene pool on purpose. By placing all future launches on the shuttle, they created the dreaded single failure point, endangering the entire species (here, the space project). And the single failure point failed.
Lesson Four:
Maintain a good gene pool: no single catastrophic failure should ever imperil a project.
Management Failures
The shuttle failure was also a management failure: it has been a shock to realize that people in business suits sitting around a table can kill just as surely as a bullet. Again, these failures for the most part stem from the initial decision to have the project in the first place: the impossible constraints stressed the management system to the breaking point.
Historically, successful projects have had clearly defined, limited goals, with a reasonable time (less than 4 years) to completion. Good projects also have good management, where responsibility and credit are delegated to the same teams for the duration. As I understand it, shuttle management failed on all counts.
The goal of the shuttle project was never clear, and constantly changing: was it to put people in space, or to be a heavy lift vehicle? More crucial was the fact that the goal became unbounded: the shuttle would do everything for everybody. The project became too big, and too long, for a happy conclusion.
As impossible schedules and budgets became more impossible, many shakeups occured. This can be disorienting: staff never knows who is responsibile for what, and no one feels accountable for anything. The usual outcome of this state of affairs is the seige mentality.
The seige mentality is where the staff feels swamped with putting out fires. Because of this, there is a complete loss of vision, a loss of communication, and a loss of responsibility. Putting out fires is just that. Unless changes are made the house will never get rebuilt.
A recent article in Infoworld discussed successful microcomputer companies: The ones that made it were the ones that stayed stable for about 4 years, then reorganized. The stable periods were for accomplishing clear, limited goals in a stable environment, and the shakeups to keep the seige mentality at bay.
It is interesting to note another parallel with evolution: recently it has become clear that species stay pretty much the same for long periods, interspersed by short periods of very rapid change.
Lesson Five:
Successful projects have clear, limited goals doable within a few years.
Conclusion
The shuttle project as implemented should never have happened. It should have been scaled down to just a vehicle to get people to space. Heavy lift tasks should have been left on heavy lift boosters. This would have increased the gene pool, given the project a clear and more limited goal, and would have been doable.
Without the impossible demands, the management could have stabilized, developed cohesive teams, delegated authority, set up a strong communications infrastructure, and accomplished it's goal in 4 years. These limited goals would have allowed more conservative engineering, with full experimental and prototype stages before production.
Such a shuttle would have built a stable base for the future expansion of space. We would be much closer to the ultimate vision than we are today.
But this scaled down shuttle might never have gotten funding. That would have been ok. Humanity could have waited a few more years.
There is one last lesson , thinking specifically of the Challenger astronauts:
Lesson Six:
Some things are worth dying for.
Brand Fortner
January 28, 1987
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